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David Loy
It  may be considered strange that Zen has in any way been affiliated with the 
spirit o f the military classes o f Japan. Whatever form Buddhism takes in the 
various countries where it flourishes, it is a religion o f compassion, and in its 
varied history it has never been found engaged in warlike activities. How is it, 
then, that Zen has come to activate the fighting spirit o f the Japanese war­
rior?
—D . T . Suzuki1
1 Zen and Japanese Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959/1973), 61.
2 New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Suzuki’s question remains the most problematic one for understanding the place o f Zen within Buddhism and comparative religion generally. In his provocative study Zen and the Way o f  the Sword: Arming the Samurai 
Psyche,2 Winston L. King raises this issue on the first page and reminds us that 
such perversions o f moral and religious ideals are not found only in Japan. 
We need only consider “ how the simple otherworldly ethic o f Jesus, the car­
penter o f Nazareth, to love those who hate us and turn the other cheek to 
those who strike us could have been transformed into the Crusaders’ gospel o f 
killing infidel Saracens or into a church of bitterly feuding and even warring 
sects. The answers to all such questions are always complex and unsatisfacto­
ry.’’ This response too, for valid as it is it overlooks the most important issue: 
the difference between our understanding o f the Crusader, who would now be 
considered benighted by all but the most fundamentalist Christians, and the 
reputation o f the Zen samurai spirit among contemporary Japanese and those 
likely to read this article. The problem, then, is not only how this perversion 
of Buddhism occurred, but why samurai Zen continues to be accepted and 
praised as a legitimate form o f Buddhism.
King never addresses this question squarely, although at times he comes 
close. Instead, Zen and the Way o f  the Sword provides a concise and admira­
bly clear introduction to a fascinating subject. An explanation o f Zen practice 
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how they adapted to each other); the history of the Japanese warrior; the na­
ture, history and forging of the Japanese sword (in loving detail and with 
many illustrations); the samurai code of bushido; the art of swordsmanship 
during the enforced peacetime of the Tokugawa period; and, the most 
provocative, a critical evaluation of D. T. Suzuki’s views on Zen swordsman­
ship. It concludes with a rather cursory consideration of martial arts today out­
side as well as inside Japan, which is such a vast subject that King is able to 
touch on only a few examples.
The author’s delight in swordmaking and swordsmanship is contagious. 
There are many line drawings, evidently from old prints, on armor and fight­
ing techniques, castles and battle formations, sword forging and testing, as 
well as the proper way to commit seppuku. This information does not break 
any new ground (and no Japanese-language sources are cited), but it is 
brought together into a well-organized overview which expands the context be­
yond Zen and Japanese culture to bring in more general questions about the 
relationship between religion and society.
Nonetheless, Zen and the Way o f the Sword is better on the sword than on 
Zen. The first chapter attempts to summarize the Buddhist and Taoist roots of 
Zen, the role of the Zen master, the function of the Zen koan and the meaning 
of Zen enlightenment into 17 pages, and is as unsatisfactory as one would 
expect. King provides no personal glimpses into his qualifications for explain­
ing Zen enlightenment, and his own efforts are not encouraging: What did Kore- 
sada realize when his nose was twisted? “ Probably that Reality and Truth are 
within” (166). His main sources are Philip Kapleau (who, despite what is said 
on page 21, never received inka from his teacher Yasutani Hakuun) and espe­
cially D. T. Suzuki. There are many quotations from Suzuki’s writings, which 
raises problems that King does not address, if it is no longer satisfactory to 
accept his version of Zen uncritically. King does not shrink from making 
some telling criticisms of Suzuki later, but this critique is limited by the fact 
that King has been dependent on Suzuki for setting the terms of the discus­
sion. The usual bifurcations are central to his explanations: intellectual, cere­
bral, conceptual, conscious, deliberate is bad; existential, visceral, intuitive, un­
conscious, instinctive is good. Given how much Suzuki criticized dualism, 
it is difficult to overlook how problematic these ones are. For one thing, such 
category-oppositions have a history and a context within Western thought 
that tends to be lost when they are translated into such a different language as 
Japanese, and vice versa: so we must be cautious about understanding the 
Japanese understanding of Zen in such terms. That Suzuki’s English was excel­
lent due to his years in the United States does not alleviate the problem but ag­
gravates it: how much do his English writings skillfully adapt Zen to Western 
sensibilities? That is, how much did he tell us what we wanted to hear? These
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considerations have become important yet King does not raise them.
Another problem with such categories is that they conveniently valorize 
characteristics that just happen to be Japanese. For example: “ Zen wants to 
act, and the most effective act, once the mind is made up, is to go on without 
looking backward. In this respect, Zen is indeed the religion of the samurai 
warrior”  (Suzuki).3 This exemplifies a general trait that Robert Bellah con­
siders the most important of Japanese society: its goal-oriented behavior.4  Ac­
cording to Nakamura Hajime, “ Japanese Buddhists came to maintain the 
view that one should repudiate traditional disciplines in th e  n am e o f  d is­
cip lines f o r  th e  p r o m o tio n  o f  p ro d u c tiv e  activ ities. ” 5 To make the same point 
from another perspective, Japanese culture is less interested in abstract theory 
and universalized principles than Indian. This raises again the old question 
how much of Zen is Buddhist and how much of Zen is Japanese. Then is Zen 
anti-intellectualism an aspect of Buddhist enlightenment, of the Japanese ver­
sion of enlightenment, or of the Japanese understanding of enlightenment?
Raising such questions about the differences between Pali Buddhism and 
Japanese Buddhism brings us back to the most important issue, the relation­
ship between Zen and the samurai spirit.
II
The Hinayana, which tends to condemn life, has remained strict in 
the prohibition of killing; and it is the Mahayana, which extols life, 
that has ended up by finding excuses for killing and even for its 
glorification.
—Paul Demi^ville6
Whether or not Pali Buddhism condemns life, it is strict in its prohibition
’ D. T. Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism: First Series (New York: Harper and Row, 
1949), 84.
4 Robert N. Bellah, Tokugawa Religion: The Cultural R oots o f  M odem  Japan (New 
York: The Free Press, 1957), 188. For a more general discussion o f  the differences be­
tween East Asia and South Asia, and where the West fits into them, see David Loy, 
“ Transcendence East and West,”  Man and W orld 26, no. 4: 403-427.
5 Hajime Nakamura, Ways o f  Thinking o f  Eastern Peoples, rev. trans., ed. by 
Philip P. Wiener (Honolulu: University o f  Hawaii Press, 1964), 505. Nakamura's em­
phasis.
4 “ Le Bouddhisme et la guerre,”  Melanges (Paris: Institut des Hautes Etudes 
Chinoises, 1957), 353.
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against taking life. The eightfold path includes right action (not destroying 
life, etc.) and right livelihood (not making one’s living through a profession 
that brings harm to others, such as trading in arms and weapons, soldiering, 
killing animals, etc.). The Dhammapada expresses the psychological dimen­
sion of such an attitude: “ Never by hatred is hatred appeased, but it is ap­
peased by kindness. This is an eternal truth.” (44) “ The victor breeds hatred, 
and the defeated lie down in misery. He who renounces both victory and 
defeat is happy and peaceful.”  (46)
Depending on how one understands life (“ we must transcend the dualism of 
life and death” ) and killing (“ no one kills, no one is killed” ), it is possible to 
take these prohibitions in more subtle ways. The danger with this, however, is 
a sophistry that can end up rationalizing Buddhism itself away. In his admira­
ble study “ The Modem State and Warfare: Is there a Buddhist Position?” 
Brian (Daizen) Victoria finds “ no evidence in what are generally considered 
to be the fundamental tenets of Buddhism (centered on the Four Noble Truths 
and Holy Eightfold Path) that would condone an adherent’s participation 
in the killing of other human beings for any reason whatsoever. Thus, Bud­
dhism, at least in its earliest formulation, must be considered to take the posi­
tion of absolute pacifism as its normative standard of conduct.” 7 The life of 
Sakyamuni Buddha, as conveyed in the Nikayas for example, is completely 
consistent with such teachings. It is inconceivable that he could have lived as 
a samurai, or that he would have approved of any such use of his teachings.
What Victoria says about the early Buddhist sangha enables us to develop 
this contrast further:
The Sangha was organized to be a non-coercive, non-authoritarian, 
democratic society where leadership came only from good moral 
character and spiritual insight. It is an order of society which has no 
political ambitions within the nation, and in whose ranks there is no 
striving for leadership. It seeks to persuade men and women to fol­
low its way, by example and exhortation, not by force. By complete­
ly eliminating the then prevalent caste system from its ranks, Buddha 
Sakyamuni may rightly be considered one of history’s first leaders 
not only to advocate but actually to practice his belief in the basic
7 In the 1990 Anthology o f  Fo Kuang Shan International Buddhist Conference, 378. 
“ My reading o f Buddhist political history tells me that every time Buddhist leaders 
have closely aligned themselves with the political ruler o f  their day, the Buddha Sangha 
has become corrupt and degenerate. . . . The Sangha's often slavish subservience to, 
and actions on behalf of, their rulers have resulted, in my opinion, in its becoming the 
de facto pimp and prostitute o f  the State.”  (379)
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equality of all human beings. He clearly hoped that the religious and 
social ideals of the Sangha would one day permeate the whole of soci­
ety. (369)
How well have these ideals pcrmaated Japanese Buddhism? Historically, 
Japan has been very good at adapting to foreign influences, and Buddhism is 
famously adaptable. This adaptability has been a two-edged sword, enabling 
Buddhism to permeate other cultures by adapting their religious institutions 
to its own ends, but also allowing Buddhism to be co-opted (even, in its 
birthplace, to be assimilated by the “ fraternal embrace”  of Hinduism, as 
Coomaraswamy put it). The Mahayana doctrine that samsara is not other 
than nirvana may be understood in opposite ways: the true sunya nature of 
samsara may be taken as nirvana itself, or nirvana redefined in more this- 
worldly ways which end up rationalizing cravings, nationalism and subser­
vience to secular authority.
From this perspective, the basic problem with Japanese Buddhism appeared 
at the very beginning: Buddhism was first brought into Japan by the ruling 
classes, who saw it as a potent means to preserve the nation—which for them 
meant their own position, of course. Zen arrived several centuries later, yet it 
continued a pattern that by then had been set. King cites the case of Eisai 
(1141-1215), the “ founder”  of Zen, as typical. After returning from his sec­
ond trip to China, during which he was ordained as a Rinzai master, Eisai 
found that his “ new” Buddhism was not acceptable to the Tendai hierarchy at 
Enryakuji. So he went to Kamakura, where he gained the favor of the widow 
of the first shogun Minamoto Yoritomo, and she established a new temple for 
him. His first major writing was Treatise on the Spread o f  Zen fo r  the Protec­
tion o f  the Nation. (DOgen too wrote a work, now lost, entitled The Method 
o f  Protecting the Country by the True Dharma.} Only later was he invited 
back to Kyoto as an honored monk-teacher. If the traditional stories can be 
trusted, establishing oneself by currying the favor of the powerful was not the 
way of Sakyamuni, nor the way o f the early Chinese patriarchs, who only 
reluctantly answered the requests of emperors to become national teachers? 
The contact with secular authority is not in itself objectionable; according to 
the Nikayas Sakyamuni had numerous dealings with rulers, but as teacher and 
adviser, evidently because his Dharma was respected for itself, as an alterna­
tive authoritative Law. The problem arises when Buddhist teachings and pres-
8 This was not as true later. “ While Buddhist monks in the southern part o f China 
(under the Chin dynasty) successfully maintained their independence o f  the State, their 
northern counterparts did not fare as well. Faced with non-Chinese rulers, Buddhists 
monks offered their services as political, diplomatic and military advisers”  (King, 371).
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tige are appropriated for other ends, as an ideology that supports the state and 
justifies privilege and class.
If, as Victoria points out, Sakyamuni believed in the equality of all human 
beings and hoped sangha ideals would come to permeate all of society, the is­
sue of social hierarchy is especially problematical for Japanese Zen, which 
came to emphasize devotion to one’s lord more than one’s personal path of 
liberation from desire and delusion. Or, more precisely, the two tended to be 
equated: to let-go of oneself was understood to mean identifying completely 
with one’s daimyo. “ I have no desire to attain buddhahood,”  Yamamoto 
Tsunetomo, author of the Hagakure, wrote after he had retired to become a 
monk. “ The sincere resolution deeply engraved on my mind is to be reborn 
for as many as seven times as a Nabeshima samurai and administer our clan.” 
However praiseworthy this may be as an example of egolessness, it still needs 
to be asked in what sense Yamamoto is a Buddhist monk.
King identifies an inbuilt factor in Buddhism which tended to work against 
its own teaching that life is sacred: a doctrine of karmic destiny. “ And free as 
Zen may have been in some respects from the bonds of the Buddhist tradition, 
it was not free from the bonds of the teaching of karma”  (33). Karma is a com­
plicated issue in Buddhism and it is too simple to say that Zen encourages us 
to accept such karma, yet something like that seems to be implied by the 
repeated exhortation to become one with our immediate circumstances. King 
also cites the strong sense of family loyalty and tradition, especially among the 
Japanese upper classes. As an endorsement of one’s family and occupation, 
however, these attitudes become questionable in the light of Sakyamuni’s own 
example—not only when they lead to violating the precept against killing, but 
because the sangha was originally established as an alternative to such family 
and caste obligations, which Sakyamuni himself had obviated by abandoning 
his own family and royal position.
The difficulty with accepting one’s “ karmic destiny”  is that a collective “ we- 
go,”  such as the Japanese understanding of egolessness encouraged, is not in­
trinsically superior to the individual ego. It may be even more dangerous, de­
pending on how those energies are channelled. It is relevant, therefore, that 
the absolute loyalty expected by family-heads and daimyo did not extend to in- 
terdaimyo relations, for the daimyo did not consider their own compacts to be 
binding. As King points out, such agreements tended to be marriages of con­
venience, “ a cagey betting on the winner of the next set of battles, cemented 
by intermarriages and hostages. Hence Japanese military history is full of tem­
porary alliances, broken or shifted when conditions changed” (132).
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Eisai’s relationship with the secu­
lar powers-that-be developed into a Faustian compact fatal to the original non­
violent spirit of Buddhism. That Zen taught the samurai how to be loyal to
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their daimyo and how to fight better for their daimyo elevated that social 
relationship above the fundamental Buddhist precept not to kill any living 
beings, especially humans. If it is important to recognize the problems with 
Western subject-object dualism, what about the dualism that pits me and my 
daimyo against you and yours? When we consider all the killing that has oc­
curred on behalf of abstractions like God and the future socialist utopia, ego­
less devotion to a particular person can seem attractive; but only until we ask 
whether what inspired that daimyo was anything more than his (and his 
clan’s) own lust for power, wealth and prestige. Accepting one's karmic role 
in such a social system does provide a clear solution to the perennial problem 
about the meaning of one’s life, yet we should be clear that this was not 
Sakyamuni's solution.
The Code o f  the Samurai exhorts that “ one who is a samurai must before 
all things keep constantly in mind, by day and by night, . . .  the fact that he 
has to die. That is his chief business”  (126). No one would deny that Zen 
should help us to be able to die; but one may still be uncomfortable with the 
other idea implicit here, that this will enable us to kill better. The issue is, 
finally, an ethical one: did bushido provide an ethic, or did it serve in place of 
an ethic? That is, did it provide some moral authority tempering the power of 
secular authority? King quotes Roger Ames: “ bushido being centered in this 
resolution to die, it is not in any strict sense an ethical system at a l l . . .  In es­
sence, it does not represent any particular mode of conduct or normative stan­
dards”  (125). This may remind us of the bodhisattva, whose compassionate ac­
tivities are not limited by the bounds of conventional morality, yet it is very 
different, because insofar as Zen did not provide an alternative moral perspec­
tive on the hierarchical and predatory social system, it became co-opted by it. 
As Ames continues: “ Of course, historically, the proponent of bushido, the 
samurai, did align himself with a prevailing morality, or more likely was bom 
into circumstances where the decision of moral alignment was predeter­
mined.”
I think King puts his finger on the problem:
If, as Suzuki claims, Zen is impatient with all rationalizing and ethi- 
cizing and believes only in visceral-intuitive rightness, if it can be (as 
already noted) “ wedded to anarchism or fascism, communism or 
democracy, atheism or idealism or any political or economic dog­
matism,”  serving any master that happens to be dominant at the 
time or place where Zen is, can it be called “ Buddhist”  in any 
meaningful sense; or is it only a subjective energy-providing tech­
nique?
. . . For essentially Zen, with its slight regard for scripture and
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literary or ritual tradition, has no means of checking its “ Buddhist” 
quality from time to time or maintaining a consistent witness to a 
good or holy life-pattern. (190-191)
Perhaps this gives us some insight into the recent scandals in many U.S. Zen 
centers, whose teachers (mostly Japanese or Japanese-trained) were disco­
vered to have engaged in sexual, financial and other misconduct. If King is 
right, the basic difficulty is that Zen training does not in itself prepare such 
teachers to deal with the kinds of moral dilemmas and temptations that their 
positions expose them to, especially in a more individualistic, non-Confucian 
society.
Suzuki could not help touching on the problem of morality in his Zen and 
Japanese Culture chapters on swordsmanship. King quotes most of a long 
paragraph that encapsulates Suzuki’s view:
The sword is generally associated with killing, and most of us won­
der how it can come into connection with Zen, which is a school of 
Buddhism that teaches the gospel of love and mercy. The fact is that 
the art of swordsmanship distinguishes between the sword that kills 
and the sword that gives life. The one that is used by a technician can­
not go any further than killing, for he never appeals to the sword un­
less he intends to kill. The case is altogether different with the one 
who is compelled to lift the sword. For it is really not he but the 
sword itself that does the killing. He has no desire to do harm to 
anybody, but the enemy appears and makes himself a victim. It is as 
though the sword performs automatically its function of justice, 
which is the function of mercy. This is the kind of sword that Christ 
is said to have brought among us. It is not meant just for bringing 
the peace mawkishly cherished by sentimentalists . . . [This sword] 
is no more a weapon of self-defense or an instrument of killing, and 
the swordsman turns into an artist of the first grade, engaged in 
producing a work of genuine originality. (Suzuki, 145)
This is not one of Suzuki’s better paragraphs. According to it, selflessness 
makes the killing sword into a life-giving instrument of righteousness, for the 
man who has mastered the art does not use the sword; thus the opponent may 
be said to kill himself. “ (T]he enemy is filled with the evil spirit of killing and 
so he is killed by this evil spirit*’ (Suzuki, 180). In the Japanese feudal era, 
though, were all enemies really evil? And what would happen, then, if feuding 
daimyo required two enlightened swordmasters to fight? Would each be killed 
by the selfless sword of the other?
King too finds such apologetics unconvincing. He is left “ almost speech-
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less” by the logic that produces this Zen work o f genuine originality, as if a 
blow that kills were ethically indistinguishable from the brushstroke o f a cal­
ligraphy master. * ‘There is a vague and imprecise hope that the Zen-inspired 
sword is, indeed, functioning as an instrument of ‘justice’—one presumes in 
the conceptual, moralistic sense of the word. But it is apparently not absolute­
ly necessary that it be so to make such deeds beyond and above ordinary ethi­
cal judgments” (186).
In sum, insofar as the Zen experience “ transcends” concepts and ethics, 
and emphasizes oneness with one’s situation, its Japanese practitioners seem 
more vulnerable to the prevailing ideology and more likely to be co-opted by 
the dominant social system. Instead o f providing a moral and spiritual perspec­
tive on secular authority, Zen ends up sacralizing secular authority.
Ill
Despite some passages (such as the above paragraph on Zen swordsmanship) 
that lend themselves to such cooptation, Suzuki himself did not fall into this 
trap. His twelve years in the U.S. and Europe (1897-1909) provided him with 
an international perspective on the emperor system, state Shinto, militarism, 
and the self-righteous “ Japanese spirit” they propagated.9
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for most o f his colleagues in the Zen 
world, who did not benefit from such a lengthy internationalization. For exam­
ple, Suzuki’s teacher Shaku Sden, a progressive, university-educated roshi 
who portrayed Buddhism as a “ universal religion” at the Chicago World’s
9 For a detailed study o f  Suzuki’s social and political views, see Kiyohide Kirita, 
“ D. T. Suzuki on Society and the State,”  in Rude Awakenings: Zen, the K yoto  School 
& the Question o f  Nationalism, edited by James W. Heisig and John C. Maraldo 
(Honolulu: University o f  Hawaii Press, 1995), 52-74. For an example o f  Suzuki’s anti­
war views, see “ Why Do We Fight?”  The Eastern Buddhist o s  vol. 1, no. 4 
(November-December 1921), 270-281. A  note on Shinran in The Eastern Buddhist OS 
vol. 1, no. 5 contrasts him favorably with Nichiren, who “ inspired the militarists o f 
some years ago when a jingoistic spirit reigned in this country”  (395-396). “ Buddhism 
and Education” (The Eastern Buddhist OS vol. 8, no. 1 [May 19491, 36-45) contrasts 
Shinto and Buddhism: “ Shinto is warlike, militant, and devoid o f  a loving spirit; while 
Buddhism is just the opposite, for it teaches all-embracing love which knows no enemy 
of whatever nature” (36). “ My firm conviction is that if Buddhism held the Japanese 
statesmen, militarists, and people generally in its firmer grasp, that is, i f  Japan had 
been governed by Buddhism and not by Shinto as she has been until recently, there 
would have been no such war as the one whose most ignominious catastrophe we 
Japanese are all experiencing just at present”  (37).
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Parliament of Religions, actively supported the Russo-Japanese War (1904- 
1905) and justified it in terms embarrassing to read today:
War is not necessarily horrible, provided that it is fought for a just 
and honorable cause, that it is fought for the upholding of humanity 
and civilization. Many material human bodies may be destroyed, 
many humane hearts be broken, but from a broader point of view 
these sacrifices are so many phoenixes consumed in the sacred fire of 
spirituality, which will arise from the smoldering ashes reanimated, 
ennobled, and glorified.10
10 Shaku Soyen, Sermons o f  a Buddhist A bbot: Addresses on Religious Subjects, 
trans. D. T. Suzuki (New York: Weiser, 1971), 211-12. The full text was originally pub­
lished in 1906 and taken from a memorial address for those who died in the war.
11 Shaku Soyen, Zen fo r  Americans (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Press, reprinted 
1974), 201-3.
Thus have all wars been justified by their apologists. When Tolstoy wrote ask­
ing him to cooperate in appealing for peace, SOen refused and visited the war 
front to encourage the troops, declaring that
war against evils must be unflinchingly prosecuted till we attain the 
final aim. In the present hostilities, into which Japan has entered 
with great reluctance, she pursues no egoistic purpose, but seeks the 
subjugation of evils hostile to civilization, peace, and enlighten­
ment. . . .  I came here with a double purpose. I wished to have my 
faith tested by going through the greatest horrors of life, but I also 
wished to inspire, if I could, our valiant soldiers with the ennobling 
thoughts of the Buddha, so as to enable them to die on the battlefield 
with the confidence that the task in which they are engaged is great 
and noble. I wished to convince them of the truths that this war is 
not a mere slaughter of their fellow-beings, but that they are combat­
ting an evil, and that, at the same time, corporeal annihilation really 
means a rebirth of soul, not in heaven, indeed, but here among our­
selves.11
Harada SOgaku (1870-1961), the abbot of Hosshin-ji, made the identification 
between Zen and war complete and explicit:
Forgetting [the difference between] self and others in every situation, 
you should always become completely one with your work. [When or­
dered to] march—tramp, tramp; [when ordered to] fire—bang, 
bang; this is the clearest expression of the highest Bodhi-wisdom, the
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unity of Zen and war.12
12 Quoted in Daizen Victoria, “ Japanese Corporate Zen," Bulletin o f  Concerned 
Asian Scholars 12, no. 1 (1980), 65.
13 History o f  Religions 33, no. 1 (August 1993), 1-43.
Editor's note: Since republished in revised form in Donald S. Lopez, Jr., ed., Cura­
tors o f  the Buddha: The Study o f Buddhism under Colonialism (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 107-160.
What is most discomforting about these words is not that Sden and Harada 
support war, but that they invoke Buddhism to justify and promote it. In 
SOen's case, a terminology appropriate to Armageddon is used to excuse a war 
of colonial expansion. In Harada's case, the nonduality of self and other—an 
essential principle o f Suzuki's timeless, ahistorical Zen—is used in a way that 
flatly contradicts the basic spirit of Sakyamuni's teachings. The issue is compli­
cated by the European colonization of Asia, which made the Japanese fearful 
for their own independence; the Russo-Japanese War, for example, was start­
ed in reaction to Russia's imperialist moves into Manchuria and the Liaodong 
peninsula. What is not complicated, however, is the unquestioned identifica­
tion of Zen ideology with nationalistic aims. If both SOen and Harada were po­
litically and historically benighted, or at least uncritical, one wonders how 
much Zen anti-intellectualism played a part in this. Again, the problem is not 
so much that they were products of their time, but how much Zen contributed 
to making and keeping them so.
A recent paper by Robert Sharf, “The Zen of Japanese Nationalism,"13 ar­
gues for a close relationship between such Zen ideology and nihoryinrort, the 
popular pseudo-science devoted to demonstrating the uniqueness (and usually 
the superiority) of Japanese culture and spirit. Sharf believes this is true not 
only for the Zen religious establishment but for the philosophical proselytizers 
whose views have been most influential in the West. He devotes a long section 
to nihonjinron themes in D. T. Suzuki's writings which he traces back to 1935, 
when Suzuki began publishing a series of Zen books in Japanese that are still 
largely unknown outside Japan. This section is not persuasive, however, in the 
light of Kirita's much more detailed study of Suzuki's social and political 
views. For example, during the Pacific War Suzuki's non-Buddhist writings 
were concerned to find a uniquely Japanese spirituality in Buddhism, especial­
ly in its Pure Land sects; yet this did not lead him to exalt the Japanese people 
or offer them as an example for the rest of the world to follow. The following 
passage is typical:
The Japanese are highly sentimental and lacking in logic, have 
difficulty in forming an independent judgment on the right and
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wrong of things, are only concerned about being ridiculed by others, 
and are reluctant to enter into unknown and unexplored areas, and if 
they should dare to do so, they do it recklessly and without any plans 
made in advance.14
14 Quoted in “ D. T. Suzuki on Society and the State,” 60. For its source, Kirita 
gives the Collected Works (in Japanese), vol. 21, page 179.
15 “Towards a Philosophy o f  Religion with the Concept o f  Pre-established Har­
mony as a Guide,”  trans. David A . Dilworth, The Eastern Buddhist, ns, vol. 3, no. 1 
(1970), 36. See Sharf, 24.
6 How much Nishida supported them, and why, are difficult issues discussed at 
length in Rude Awakenings. Sec especially the chapters by Ives, Ueda, Yusa, and 
Jacinto Zavala.
This is not nihonjinron. However, some of Sharps other targets are more 
difficult to defend. Suzuki’s lifelong friend the philosopher Nishida KitarO 
“ was himself guilty of the most spurious forms of nihonjinron speculation,” 
such as repeatedly characterizing Japanese culture as one of “ pure feeling,” 
more emotional, aesthetic and communal than (and, by implication, superior 
to) the intellectual, rationalistic and scientific cultures of the West (23). In 
1944, a difficult year for all Japanese, Nishida declared that contemporary 
Buddhists “ have forgotten [the] true meaning of the Mahayana. Eastern cul­
ture must arise again from such a standpoint. It must contribute a new light to 
world culture. As a self-determination of the absolute present, the national 
polity (kokutai) of Japan is a norm of historical action in such a perspective. 
The above mentioned true spirit of the Mahayana is in the East preserved 
today only in Japan.” 15 This must be taken in the light of Nishida’s apparent 
support for the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere and for the Pacific 
War.16
Such a nihonjinron attitude was evidently shared by Hisamatsu Shin’ichi 
(1889-1980), who also believed that only Japanese have the aesthetic and in­
tellectual sensibility necessary to fathom Zen, despite the fact that this truth 
was universal:
I have long spoken of “ Oriental Nothingness” . . . I qualify it as 
Oriental because in the West such Nothingness has never been fully 
awakened, nor has there been penetration to such a level. However, 
this does not mean that it belongs exclusively to the East. On the con­
trary, it is the most profound basis or root source of man; in this 
sense it belongs neither to the East or West. Only as regards the ac­
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West; hence the regional qualification “ Oriental.” 17
Sharf recounts a well-known conversation between Hisamatsu and Suzuki 
recorded at Harvard University in 1958:
Hisamatsu: Among the many people you’ve met or heard of (in the West) is 
there anyone who you think has some understanding of Zen?
Suzuki: No one. Not yet anyway.
Hisamatsu: 1 see. Not yet. Well then, is there at least someone you have 
hope for? (Laughter)
Suzuki: No. Not even that.
Hisamatsu: So, of the many people (in the West) who have written about 
Zen there aren’t any who understand it?
Suzuki: That’s right.
Hisamatsu: Well, is there at least some book written (by a Westerner) which 
is at least fairly accurate?
Suzuki: No. Not to my knowledge.18
Taken out of context, this conversation is somewhat misleading: Suzuki had 
high hopes for Zen in the West, while recognizing that its naturalization 
abroad would take time. Nonetheless, if Zen experience is indeed the essence 
of all religion, as Suzuki so often claimed, this conclusion cannot help but be 
depressing. Yet there is more than one way to understand their dialogue. It 
may be that Occidental culture is so rationalistic and so infected by subject­
object dualism that all Westerners are spiritually obtuse. But it is also possible 
that the problem is on the other side as well: that a supposedly universal 
experience has in fact come to be defined primarily in Japanese terms.
Sharf concludes by situating the nihonjinron impulse in its historical con­
text, as one intellectual reaction to the radical and destabilizing transforma­
tion of Japan initiated by the Meiji reformation:
Nihonjinron is in large part a Japanese response to modernity—the 
sense of being adrift in a sea of tumultuous change, cut off from the 
past, alienated from history and tradition. Since the Meiji reforms, 
Japanese intellectuals have been confronted with the collapse of 
traditional Japanese political and social structures, accompanied by 
the insidious threat posed by the the hegemonic discourse of the
” Zen and the Fine Arts, trans. Gishin Tokiwa (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1971; originally 
published in 1957 as Zen to  hijutsu), 48. See Sharf, 31-2.
” FAS Society Journal (Spring 1986), 19-23.
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West. In  response, the Japanese would formulate a conception o f 
Japaneseness that would, in part, insulate themselves from  Western 
universalizing discourse. This was accomplished through insisting 
that the essence o f Japanese character lay in a uniquely Japanese 
experience o f the world, an experience that was thus conveniently 
out o f  the reach o f foreigners. (36-37)
Whether or not this overstates the case, it  touches on something important. 
The M eiji restoration remains an ambiguous legacy. Traumatized by its brutal 
forced opening to the rest o f  the world, acutely aware o f the need to adopt 
Western technology as quickly as possible in order to defend itself from  the im ­
minent colonization that devastated the rest o f Asia, not only Japan’s self­
confidence but its very self-identity were badly shaken. I t  is not surprising, 
then, that Zen and the samurai spirit became understood to exemplify the su­
perior soul o f the Japanese—which happened to fit nicely into a concern that 
arose in certain quarters o f the West to  find a superior “ other”  w ith which to 
flog itself. We may sympathize with Japan’s need to establish its own identity 
on the world stage, and Japanese intellectuals’ need to  avoid the “ hegemonic 
discourse”  o f the West. Nonetheless, the resulting self-understanding o f 
Japanese Zen Buddhists cannot be accepted uncritically.19
”  I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer and Dan Yukie for their helpful com­
ments on an earlier draft o f  this essay.
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